INDEMNIFICATION OF INSIDERS' LITIGATION
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Litigation expenses are borne cheerlessly at best.

All the less bearable are

they when charged to the "wrong" party. If such a mischarge could be prevented
by a simple formula whenever corporate insiders' are involved in litigation arising
from management of the business, the common law well might have found that

formula; and statutory modifications, where necessary at all, could have been brief,
uniform, and satisfactory.
But determining whether a particular litigation expense is a legitimate cost of
the business or a personal risk of the insider-defendant requires consideration of a
variety of possible circumstances. Neither the common law nor most of the twentyfour statutory enactments of the last sixteen years have given due recognition to the
relevance of these circumstances, nor have they agreed on whether the courts or the
directors themselves should make the determination.
These circumstances and their interrelated bearing on the propriety of indemnity
are suggested by four general questions:
First, what was the nature of the litigation? It may have been an action in which
the corporation was the plaintiff, either on its own initiative or in an action brought
derivatively by its shareholders or creditors. It may have been brought by private
parties, hostile to the corporation, against the corporation and the insiders to enforce
a private right or a public policy. It may have been initiated by shareholders in the
course of a proxy contest to test the validity of corporate practices or procedures
allegedly giving an unfair advantage to insiders in the contest Or it may have been
a government proceeding, civil or criminal, against the corporation and its insiders
to exact a fine or otherwise penalize or enjoin corporate conduct or practices initiated
or approved by the insiders.
Second, what was the nature of the act or conduct complained of? It may have
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1 Most statutes now define "insiders" to include former, present, and future directors and officers of the
corporation and also persons who may have been requested by the corporation to serve as directors or
officers of another corporation in which the corporation has an interest.
'Litigation of this type has arisen out of all the following recent proxy contests in widely-held
corporations: American Woolen (Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Mass.
1954)); New York Central (Schildkret v. Ebbott, 148 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 1 App. Div. ad
879, x5o N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1956) (action by Young and Kirby against insiders before the election
of directors was consolidated with other actions brought after the election)); Montgomery Ward (Wolfson
v. Avery, 6 Ill.2d 78, x26 N.E.2d 701 (1955)); Fairbanks-Morse (Penn-Texas Corp. v. Morse, 242 F.2d
243 ( 7 th Cir. 1957)); Loew's (Tomlinson v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 518, afld, 135 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch.
1957))3 Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957)).
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been such that the defendant knew or ought to have known that it was wrong.
Or it may have been such that he could not fairly be charged with foreseeing the
possibility that it would be alleged or found to be unlawful.
Third, what was the disposition of the action? The insiders may have been
wholly vindicated by judgment or dismissal on the merits. The action may have
been terminated by the litigative process unfavorably for either party otherwise
than on the merits. Or part of what the plaintiff sought may have been granted,
the rest refused. Most likely, considering the small proportion of actions that ever
proceed to final judgment, it was settled. The settlement may have obviated any
judicial pronouncement on the merits. Or it may have been effected, after a verdict
or judgment for or against the insiders, to avoid an appeal.
Finally, what was the relationship between "ownership" and insider-management
in this corporation, and, in the light of that relationship, what internal action was
taken or procedure followed regarding both the act or conduct complained of and
the act of indemnification itself? As to the act complained of, the shareholders may
have approved it. As to indemnification, they may have voted specifically that the
corporation assume the expense of defending the act complained of. In either
case, the disinterestedness of the assenting shareholders is relevant. And if they
have not voted, the question remains whether there are interests to be protected
against the particular indemnity and whether the corporate procedures usually prescribed for the protection of those interests when analogous corporate decisions are
made have been followed in the decision to indemnify.
By i94i, scarcely more than twenty major cases and no statutes dealt with indemnification of directors for litigation expenses. With few exceptions,3 the cases
arose out of shareholders' derivative actions in which wrongdoing by insiders was
alleged and a money recovery for the corporation was the principal relief sought.
These pre-statute cases, in their inattention to the relevance of the circumstances
suggested above or in their failure, when they did refer to the circumstances, to
state meaningful criteria for weighing them, set the stage for statutory action.
Although the corporation realized recoveries in many of the derivative actions, so
that the courts were able to come rather easily to the conclusion that indemnification
for litigation fees should not be allowed to the unsuccessful defendants,4 the courts
'Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, z89 N.W. 276 (X922); Albrecht, Maguire & Co.,
Inc. v. General Plastics, Inc., 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 45 (4th Dep't 1939). In Mason v. Pcwabic
Min. Co., 66 Fed. 391 (6th Cir. 1894), plaintiffs asked not for a money accounting, but for dissolution
of the corporation and distribution of its assets in lieu of a plan of defendants for sale of assets and
continuation of the business. See also note 14 infra.
' Mason v. Pewabic Min. Co., supra note 3; Wickersham v. Crittenden, 1o6 Cal. 329, 39 Pac. 603
(i895); McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling Co., 31 Mont. 563, 572, 79 Pac. 248, 251 (19o5);
Mcourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. io3 (8th Cir. i9o6); Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, 109 Me.403,
84 At. 892 (1912); Hooker, Corser and Mitchell Co. v. Hooker, 88 Vt. 335, 92 Atl. 443 (1914); Brock
v. Automobile Livery & Sales Co., 137 La. 9, 68 So. 195 (1915); General Mortgage and Loan Corp.
v. Guaranty Mortgage and Securities Corp., 264 Mass. 253, 162 N.E. 319 (X928); Apfel v. Auditore, 223
App. Div. 457, 228 N.Y. Supp. 489 (ist Dep't 1928); Monahan v. Kenny, 248 App. Div. 159, 288 N.Y.
Supp. 323 (ist Dep't 1936); Atwater v. Elkhorn Valley Coal-Land Co., 584 App. Div. 253, 258-59, 171
N.Y. Supp. 552, 556 (st Dep't 1918) (dictum), afl'd, 227 N.Y. 61i, x25 N.E. 912 (1919).
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did not say that indemnity would be denied only when defendants had been unsuccessful. Neither did they say that success by defendants in derivative actions
would bring indemnity; nor, where they granted indemnity to defendants who had
been wholly or partly successful, 5 that it was based on success. They instead talked
about whether counsel had actually represented the individual defendants or the
corporation. This led them to inquire whether the corporate defendant had "interests" to be protected that would require representation or whether it had any
"benefit" to receive from representation; and they concluded when plaintiffs won
substantial victories that the corporation was neither represented nor benefited by defendants' counsel! This test, of course, ignores the question whether the defense
of the individual, even when the corporation is not "directly" represented, cannot
in some cases be a proper cost of the business. This test would also lead to the
conclusion that indemnity is as inappropriate when the insider in a derivative action
is wholly successful in his defense as when he is unsuccessful.
This test, moreover, led to a misconception so persistent in the cases that it has
misshaped some of the statutes. The courts said that in the absence of a "benefit"
to the corporation in the defense, there was an absence of "power" in the corporation
to indemnify. This "power" argument was used, inappropriately, in cases where
insiders sought indemnity against a corporation unwilling to grant it. The
"power" of the corporation, therefore, was not at issue in those cases. While an
absence of benefit in the defense itself may be a logical reason for refusing to
find a right to indemnity against an unwilling corporation, the power of a willing
corporation to make indemnity could be based on benefits to the corporation quite
beyond the value to it of the immediate defense. The growing need of corporations
to improve their relationships with their employees, management and otherwise,
5

Esposito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185,.igi N.E. 363 (934);

129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (Ch. 1941).

Solimine v. Hollander,

'Wickersham v. Crittenden, io6 Cal. 329, 330, 39 Pac. 603, 6o3 (1895); Chabot & Richard Co. v.
Chabot, iog Me. 403, 407, 84 Ad. 892, 894 (1912); Brock v. Automobile Livery & Sales Co., 137 La. 9,
12, 68 So. 195, x96 (1915); General Mortgage and Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Mortgage and Securities
Corp., 264 Mass. 253, 261, 264, 162 N.E. 319, 322, 323 (1918) (but finding that attorney's services did
not "benefit" corporation held not to require attorney to return fees paid by corporation, because there was
no finding that he "knew" his services would not benefit corporation); Apfel v. Auditore, 223 App. Div.
457, 458, 228 N.Y. Supp. 489, 490 (ist Dept. x928); Monahan v. Kenny, 248 App. Div. 159, 16o-6i,
288 N.Y. Supp. 323, 324 (ist Dept. 1936); Wood v. Noma Electric Corp., 96 N.Y.L.J. izi2 (City Ct
1936).
" Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, supra note 6; Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627,
634, 189 NAV. 276, 278 (1922); Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 556, 175 N.E. 222, 223 (1931)
(quoting with approval the passage from the Jesse case, supra); New York Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173
Misc. 1o6, I6 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. X939). The New York Dock Company was in an anomalous
position on this point. The defendant directors had been successful and presumably wanted to vote indemnity but were "reluctant" to do so only because they did not know whether they could "safely" do
so under the law (i.e., whether the corporation had the "power" to do so, even though willing). By
agreement, a declaratory judgment was sought, and the corporation was represented by independent
counsel who construed their obligation as requiring them to argue, as though representing an unwilling
corporation, that if there were no automatic legal obligation to pay, a decision to pay would be beyond
the corporation's powers. See Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders'
Stits, 40 CoLum. L. REV. 431, 442-43 (1940).
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and the emerging social role assumed by or imposed upon them by their size and
influence have opened new areas in which the "power" of a corporation to act for
corporate interests that are indirect and intangible is now recognized. Such interests
support payments and commitments in discharge of moral obligations; for community, charitable, and educational purposes; and, more strikingly analogous to
"underwriting" an employee's service-connected litigation expenses, for compensation and fringe benefits of a wide variety, including workmen's compensation
insurance and payments, disability payments, pensions, stock-option plans, and sickness, medical, and rehabilitation plans and funds! Such interests, to be sure, might
have occurred more readily to the courts had any case presented squarely the validity
of an indemnity agreed to by the corporation before the litigation arose. But such
a benefit, once recognized, could conceivably support an undertaking under proper
circumstances after the litigation arose.
The courts, however, gave no sign of having considered that a "power" to indemnify, where the corporation was willing to undertake such an obligation, could
be supported in any case by a benefit to the corporation in the form of protection
of the insider against business-connected litigation costs. Thus unanalyzed, the
"lack of power" doctrine barred the path to a sensible inquiry whether a particular
expense was one which the corporation could at least elect to assume as a legitimate
cost of doing business. And it hampered the common law in reaching a case-by-case
but consistent philosophy about how the relevant circumstances in an indemnity
case should be weighed.
This failure to provide workable rules in the easily-decided cases where defendants
were unsuccessful in derivative actions left the courts at sea in the later cases where
defendants were wholly or partly successful. In Figge v. Bergenthal,9 the earliest
indemnity case arising out of a derivative action in which defendants won a partial
victory on the merits, other claims having been held barred by limitations, the court
allowed indemnity, but made no reference in its opinion to the weight it accorded
the action of the defendant majority shareholders in voting indemnity during the
°
trial. Thereafter, in the derivative action of Griesse v. Lang, in which defendants
were wholly successful, indemnity was disallowed, and Figge was distinguished on
the grounds that no action was taken by the Lang shareholders." But then, in
Esposito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co.,' 2 defendants were partially successful and
partially unsuccessful, and indemnity was allowed, without any reference to possible
corporate action by shareholders or otherwise. To further the uncertainty, the
a
almost wholly unsuccessful defendants in Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co.," were
See Jervis, Corporate Agreements to Pay Directors Expenses in gtockholders' Suits, 40 COLUm. L.
REV. 1192, 1199-200 (1940); Bishop, Current Status of Corporate Directors' Rights to Indemnification,
69 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1o62 (1956).
SI30 Wis. 594, Sog N.W. 581 (1907).
1037 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (193).
1 37 Ohio App. at 556, X75 N.E. at 223.
12287 Mass. x85, 191 N.E. 363 (1934).
13 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N.Y. Supp. 236 (ist Dep't 1912), modified, 212 N.Y. 121, 1o5 N.E. 818
(1914); 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N.Y. Supp. 251 (ist Dep't 1917), afi'd, 227 N.Y. 656, 126 N.E. 9o8
(1920).
8
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allowed indemnity on the grounds that a receivership of the corporation as well
as an accounting against the individuals had been sought and had been successfully
resisted in part. 4
Neither did clear rules emerge from the opinions in the cases arising out of
nonderivative actions. In Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 5 indemnity was refused with regard to a personal action for fraud against insiders in the purchase of
stock, without regard to the disposition of the action, which was pending at the time
of the decision on litigation expenses, and also in disregard of a shareholders' resolution, adopted without objection, authorizing the defraying of expenses of the defense.
In Albrecht Maguire & Co. v. GeneralPlastics, Inc.,'6 on the other hand, indemnity

was allowed, even though plaintiffs were successful in their contention that nonassenting shareholders could not be deprived of their pre-emptive rights by an
amendment to the certificate of incorporation. No action by directors or shareholders on the indemnity matter was indicated, nor was anything said about the
composition of the shareholdings in relation to the purpose or effect of the issuance complained of. Indemnity was allowed, the court indicated, because the insiders "acted in good faith" and issued stock pursuant to a vote of the shareholders1 7 While the results in both cases may have been justifiable, they were
reached without the support of articulated rules.
"'The Godley case, however, does not clearly support the proposition, for which it is frequeitly
cited, that indemnity will be allowed whenever the complaint seeks a receivership as well as relief
against the individuals. The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals described the complaint in the
Elizabeth Godley action (1912) as alleging only wrongful paymefits to the directors, who were adjudged
liable by the trial court the Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals, and who were directed to
repay to the corporation more than Seoo,ooo. The trial court also ordered defendants to repay amounts
disbursed by the corporation for their litigation expenses in the action. The Appellate DI ision agreed
that "it would seem as if the directors who were responsible for the conditions that required the action
should pay such [litigation] expenses, instead of the corporation itself." 153 App. Div. at 714, 139
N.Y. Supp. at 249. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment on this point, however, becatise
the original complaint had not sought any return of payments made.for litigation expenses during the
action and because there remained some uncertainty in the evidence as to the precise amount paid
for such expenses by the corporation; but it did so "without prejudice . . . to the plaintiff's right to
bring a new action therefor if so advised." 212 N.Y. at r37, 105 N.E. at 823. No questions of
receivership were dealt with in the Court of Appeals opinion.
In the George Godley action (19x6), other wrongful payments were alleged, induding counsel fees
in an action not identified, but described as seeking appointment of a receiver. The George Godley
action was dismissed by the Appellate Division for failure to allege demand on the corporation. By way
of dictum, the court noted that the judgment under review included an item for fees paid to counsel
"in resisting the appointment of a receiver." The court said that the scope of the receivership was
"restricted" by the Court of Appeals and that counsel fees in such a matter were properly paid by the
corporation. x8x App. Div. at 78, 168 N.Y. Supp. at 254. This language leaves a question whether
the Appellate Division got confused into condoning, by dictum, the payment of fees which both it and
the Court of Appeals had previously indicated should be borne by the individual defendants, in so far
as they represented services performed substantially in defense of the unsuccessful defendants and only
nominally in resisting a receivership, or whether fees on the receivership aspects of the Elizabeth Godley
or some other case were separable from the other fees. In New York Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc.
io6, 112, x6 N.Y.S.2d 844, 849 (Sup. Ct. 1939), the court rejected the argument that a benefit to
the corporation results in resisting a receivership "asked for merely as an incidental matter." See Washington, supra note 7, at 435-37.
t 177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W. 276 (1922).
10 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415 ( 4 th Dep't 1939).
.7 256 App. Div. at 139, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 420.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

The climax of this confusion in the common law was reached in New Yor( Docl(
v. McCollum,"8 in which indemnity was refused in a derivative action, even though
defendants were wholly successful. The corporation was willing to pay, but was
uncertain of its "power" or "right" to do so in view of the common-law language
already described. The court held, without referring to the possibility of any
corporate action that might validate assumption of the expenses, that there was no
"right" of the insiders to be paid and no "power" in the corporation to assume the
obligation in the absence of a corporate "interest." The court could find no such
"interest," even in the successful defense of a derivative action.
The statutory reaction to these decisions has developed along three general
lines since 194IP1 The first and least reasoned of these, which is represented by the
four "right" states, New York, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky, was to
provide that insiders have a "right" to be reimbursed under all circumstances, except
only when there has been "negligence or misconduct" or an unsuccessful defense
by the insiders. This reaction, like the common-law cases, fails to give adequate
recognition to the different types of action that might be involved, the variety of
the allegations that might be at issue, and the area of discretion in which a corporation should be left free, by whatever methods afford suitable protection to minority
interests, to commit itself or not to commit itself to indemnify. This approach
undertakes to prevent the possible mischarges to insiders, produced by common-law
misconceptions, by charging everything to the corporation in all cases, except those
that would go to final judgment and that defendants would lose.
The New York statute, which was the first indemnity statute to be enacted,
confers the broadest right in one respect: the right is withheld only when the insider has been "adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct20 in the performance of
his duties."'" Wisconsin withholds the right if the insider "is guilty of negligence or
is 173 Misc. so6, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
IL For other analyses of the statutes, see Comments, 40

CALI'.

L. REv. 104

(1952), 52

Micn. L. RaV.

(5954)" The word "misconduct" bears moral overtones, but has no well-understood legal connotation that
would facilitate its interpretation in a case, let us say, where the insiders commit or authorize an unlawful
act which they believe lawful or about the unlawfulness of which they had no thought at all. WEBSTa'S
Naw ITrr A A L DicnONARY (2d ed. 1950) is of little help in defining "misconduct," offering only
such adjectives, equally lacking in content, as "bad," "wrong," or "improper" acts or behavior. This
word, picked up from the New York statute, is now firmly embedded in most indemnity statutes. It
probably came to the New York statute from a draft of a corporation bylaw prepared by corporate
counsel. The bylaw proposed in April 1939, the second of z69 analyzed in Bates and Zuckert, Directors'
Indemnity: Corpolate Policy or Publie Policy, 20 HARv. Bus. REv. 244, 251 (941), wherein the phrase
"wilful misconduct" is used, could be the anonymous source. The inappropriateness of the concept of
"adjudgment" or "guilt" of "misconduct" is emphasized by Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.
3o5 N.Y. 395, X13 N.E.2d 533 (953), in which the statute was held to give a right to indemnity only
as to civil actions, and not as to a criminal proceeding for violation of the federal antitrust laws brought
jointly against the corporation and certain directors, the individuals having pleaded nolo contendere.
MODEL BusiNEss Coi.VovRsoN Aar § 4(0) was amended in 1957 to make the language of the statute
expressly applicable to actions "civil or criminal."
"N.Y. GEN. CoRP'. LAw §§ 64-68 inclusive. (Emphasis added.) An analysis of this statute is
made by Bishop, supra note 8.
1023
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misconduct."
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This variation from the New York language of "adjudgment" may

have been intended to deprive the insider of his right of indemnity if he had been
negligent or had misconducted himself and had escaped "adjudgment" by settlement or otherwise.23 The determination of "guilt" of "negligence" or "misconduct"
other than by the "adjudgment" of a court raises so many obvious difficulties, however, that it is doubtful whether the Wisconsin statute effects any practical protection against indemnifying a "guilty" insider who has avoided "adjudgment."
Since the Wisconsin statute contains no other reservations, it confers the most
unqualified "right" to indemnity. Provisions in section sixty-seven of the New
York statute further qualify the right to an extent not entirely clear. They provide
that the court "shall" award indemnity where the defendant has been wholly or
partly successful 24 or where the action has been settled with approval of the court.
But this language leaves open the question of whether the court may or may not
confer a right to indemnity in other situations which do not amount to adjudgment
for negligence or misconduct. These provisions are also susceptible to the interpretation that even on a mandatory award, the court has discretion to allow only so
much of a reasonable fee as it would deem reasonable to allow under the circumstances;25 and the New York right is also made expressly subject to inconsistent
shareholder action prior to accrual of the alleged cause of action and to inconsistent
terms of a court-approved settlement.28
The Pennsylvania right is more dearly circumscribed than the other two. The
right arises only from the "successful defense" of an action, with express discretion
in the. court to assess the corporation only such amount as it deems reasonable where
the defendants are only partly successful or have settled with the approval of the
27

court.

The Kentucky statute conditions the right where settlement has been effected
on approval of the settlement by the board of directors and a "determination" by the
board that the defendants were "not guilty of actual negligence or misconduct."2
S2Ws. STAT. § 180.407 (1955).

(Emphasis added.).

For an analysis of this statute, see Note,

195o Wis. L. Rav. 157.

"Consider, for example, Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 12o N.E.2d 819 (1954), in which

defendant admitted misappropriation and diversion of funds, but successfully moved to dismiss on the
grounds of acquiescence and ratification by plaintiff, who was the only other shareholder. The court
thought it would be "unconscionable" to prefer one "wrongdoer" over another by letting defendant's
expenses be paid by the corporation and plaintiff's not. It "escaped" from this result by ruling that the
defendant had been "adjudged" liable, even though there had been no such judgment. The dissent
seemed less worried about there having been no adjudgment than it did about there having been, in its
opinion, no "misconduct."
" "Successful," as used here, has been interpreted not to require success on the merits. Indemnity
was allowed in Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 App. Div. ioo, io6 N.Y.S.2d 142 ( 4 th Dep't 1951) after
dismissal under the statute of limitations.
5
" N.Y. GEs. CORP. LAw § 64 provides that the applicant for indemnity "shall be entitled to have
his reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually and necessarily incurred . . . assessed against
the corporation . . . to the extent provided by section . . . sixty seven ..

"

Section 67 provides that

if the applicant was successful in whole or in part or the action has been settled with court approval, "the
Court shall grant such application in such amount as it shall find to be reasonable .. "
'" d. § 67 (ii), (ii).
'PA.
STAT. ANx. tit. X2, J 1323 (953).
'Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.375 0955). See also id. § 27i.125 (Is).
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The defendants themselves may not sit as judges in this director-judged determination, and if, for that reason, a quorum of disinterested directors cannot be obtained,
the statute provides that a committee of three disinterested shareholders shall make
the determination. This extra safeguard may have followed from an express enlargement of the indemnity in Kentucky to include, in addition to costs and expenses, any amount paid in settlement.
Having thus conferred a statutory right of indemnity on the insider, subject only
to the reservations set forth in the statutes, these states (except Kentucky) then go on
to-provide that the statutory right is not exclusive and presumably may be enlarged
by articles, bylaws, or directors' resolutions2 9 Unnecessary confusion is introduced
by these duplicate provisions. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, for example, both
provide that a corporation has power to indemnify insiders, that such "indemnification" is not exclusive, but that it exists only unless the articles provide otherwise.
While this qualification appears to invite and honor articles denying indemnity,
such articles might well be nullified by the statute conferring indemnity as a "right."
Further, if a corporation should exercise its power to confer indemnity narrower
in any respect than the statutory "right," the bylaw, article, resolution, or other
document so narrowing the indemnity might be held ineffective s°
A second and more restrained approach to "correcting" the common-law decisions
is made by the Delaware-type statutes, which give express power to the corporation
to indemnify insiders not adjudged guilty of negligence or misconduct, but confer
no right of indemnity in the absence of corporate action creating it. This approach
comes nearest to constituting the "new look" on this subject, if only because it is
fashionable. It was adopted, without significant modification, by Rhode Island 31 in
1948, and Maryland3 2 and Minnesota33 in i95i; and it was adopted as part of the
completely revised codes of Oregon34 in 1953, the District of Columbia " in 1954,
Ohio3" and Texas3 7 in 1955, Puerto Rico3" in 1956, and Nevada30 and North
Dakota40 in

1957. It has also been adopted, without significant change, as a part
" WIs. STAT. § 180.04 (I4) (1955); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 63; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-410

(Supp. 1956). The New York statute is again ambiguous as to whether a vote of shareholders would be
required to enact a bylaw or "resolution" providing indemnity.
"0Wisconsin has vacillated on the need for two separate statutes. In 1949, it repealed the "right"
statute, leaving the "power" provision. In 195i, it restored the "right" statute on the theory that indemnity, "if warranted, should be automatic and should not lie in the discretion of directors"; but
it kept the "power" provision. Wys. STAT. § x80.4o7i Revision Committee Note, x953 (x955).
"' RI. Pub. Laws (1948), c. 2154.
"M. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 6o (195).
5
" MINN. STAT. § 301.09 (7) (1953).
"ORE. REV. STAT. c. 57, 030 (15) (Supp. 1955).
"D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-904p (Supp. 1956).
"OHIO. REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (E) (Page Supp. 1956).
"TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.02 (x6) (956).
",P.R. LAws ANN. tit., § 202 (1O) (Supp. 1956).
3"NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.070 (6) (Supp. 1957). The wording of this statute makes all powers

conferred by statute, including the power to indemnify, subject to limitation in the articles of incorporation.
"0N.D. Laws 1957, C. 102, § 4 (r5).
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of the Model Business Corporation Act of the American Bar Association. 4 All
these statutes read substantially like the Delaware statute, 42 which is as follows:
Every corporation shall have power to ...
Indemnify any and all of its directors or officers or former directors or officers or any
person who may have served at its request as a director or officer of another corporation
in which it owns shares of capital stock or of which it is a creditor against expenses
actually and necessarily incurred by them in connection with the defense of any action,
suit or proceeding in which they, or any of them, are made parties, or a party, by reason
of being or having been directors or officers or a director or officer of the corporation, or of
such other corporation, except in relation to matters as to which any such director or
officer or former director or officer or person shall be adjudged in such action, suit or
proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty. Such
indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may be entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise.
As with many fashions, this approach covers a trouble, but does not eliminate
it. It presupposes that the main fault in the common law was its refusal to find a
corporate "power" to indemnify and that the way to remedy that fault is to make an
express conferral of that power by statute.4 3 Actually, the fault of the common
law was its failure to recognize and articulate rules for dealing with all the relevant
circumstances out of which the indemnity claim arose, and the "no power" talk
was only a manifestation of that failure. The Delaware-type statute,- by directing
itself to the manifestation rather than the cause of difficulty, slays what it thinks
is the common-law dragon and leaves the field. The directors themselves then have a
free hand to select the means for exercising the power: whether by management
decision delegated to it by the directors, simple resolution of the directors, directorpassed bylaw, director-approved contracts with insiders, or otherwise. And they
are left virtually free to dictate the terms on which indemnity will be granted.
Further, the "nonexclusive" clause commonly found in the final sentence of these
statutes appears to empower the directors to grant "other and further" indemnity
or to give insiders "other rights" under bylaws or other action of directors or shareholders. Does this clause mean that the directors are thus empowered to indemnify
insiders on terms other and further than those stipulated in the first part of the
section, in which power to indemnify is given so long as negligence or misconduct
is not adjudged? If not, what is the purpose of the "nonexdusive" clause? If so,
is the effect any less than that insiders are enabled under the statute to adopt any
means and terms of indemnity they wish? These questions have yet to be an" MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATrON AcT § 4 (o).

A 1957 amendment recognizes the inconsistency in

conferring a "power" and then referring, in the last sentence of the statute, to "such indemnification."
(Emphasis added.) The amendment reads, ". . . and to make any other indemnification which shall
be provided for by the articles of incorporation, by-laws, agreement, vote of shareholders, or otherwise."
See also note 20 supra.
"DEL.

8, § 122 (so) (1953).
CODE ANN. tit.

"'Most of the provisions cited in notes 3 1-41 supra are contained in the chapter or section of the
corporation statute which deals with the corporate powers.
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swered,4 4 but, meanwhile, this statutory solution may be said, in the wide discretion
it gives to directors and in the ambiguity of its provisions, to contain as much
possibility for a mischarge to the corporation as the common law contained for a

mischarge to the insider.
The areas in which such a mischarge may be feared under the Delaware approach are best suggested by the statutory provisions of those states which have
followed Delaware in part, but have made significant alterations. Three states,
Connecticut, Maine, and Virginia, have foreseen situations in which a directors' resolution or a bylaw enacted only by directors, especially where many or most of them
were defendants, might fail to protect the minority or corporate interests. It is
arguable that this danger can be dealt with after it occurs by invoking the court's
equitable powers to find a breach of the insiders' fiduciary obligations, although no
case has yet tested the outer boundaries that equity would impose on the insiders'
freedom to enact a bylaw permitted by the statute. These states prefer to recognize in advance and deal in the statute with the conflict of interest latent in a
director-passed bylaw specifying indemnity terms. A bylaw in Connecticut" or
bylaw, article, or resolution in Maine," must be enacted by a majority vote of the
shareholders. In Virginia, the statute is worded to require some indemnity bylaws
to be approved by shareholders, but whether all would require approval is not

dear

47

The main preoccupation in four other states which have modified the Delaware
approach is with the possibility of mischarge to the corporation in settlement.
Michigan makes a faint effort to prevent such a mischarge by denying the corporation the power to indemnify in matters "settled by agreement predicated on ...
liability [for negligence or misconduct]."" Like the Wisconsin provision for
determining guilt other than by adjudgment, this reservation provides no machinery
for determining nonadjudged "liability" and is rather unrealistic in supposing that
a settlement would contain a recital that it was based upon guilt or liability.
"A dictum in Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1953) suggests
that the statute does not control every situation in which indemnification would be appropriate and
quotes the "nonexcIusive" clause of the statute and a similar "nonexclusivc" clause in the bylaw of the
corporation which contained indemnity language broader than the indemnity authorized by statute. See
note 48 infra. Accordingly, a contract indemifying a director who was not a served party in the action
was held valid. And in Sorenson v. The Overland Corporation, 242 F.2d 70 ( 3 d Cir. 1957), an indemnity agreement under the same bylaw was held inapplicable, because the court thought that expenses in litigation arising out of defendant's successful defense of compensation arrangements
made with him before he became an officer were incurred by him as an individual, "not because he was
an officer."
"CoNN.

GEN. STAT. § 5129 (1949).

But this statute provides that the section shall not "affect

any right to which [the insider] is entitled under any ... statute, by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders
or otherwise," without saying whether the agreement or other basis of indemnity (a director's resolution?) would require stockholders' approval.
"ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 53, § 24 (1954). Maine has the same proviso as Connecticut referred
to in note 45 supra.
"'VA. Cona ANN. § 13.1-3 (n) (SUpp. 1956). The statute gives a general power to indemnify
by action not specified, but presumably it could be exercised in a bylaw. It then authorizes "other or
further indemnity" by articles "or any by-law made by the stockholders."
" MieN. Comsp. LAws § 450.10 (1) (1948).
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Three states, New Jersey, Montana, and Missouri, deny power to indemnify
unless the directors, as in Kentucky, make a determination regarding the fairness of
the settlement and the nonadjudged culpability of the defendants. New Jersey
provides that it shall be determined by the board, or in any other manner allowed by
the articles or bylaws, that the defendant has "not in any substantial way been derelict
in the performance of his duties as charged in such action."49 This determination
would call, in many cases, for the possession by laymen directors of considerable
sophistication in legal thought and language, extraordinary detachment from the
views and interests of their insider-colleagues, and ability of the very highest judicial
order.
In recognition of the judicial nature of the duty thus thrust on the directors,
Montana permits them to "rely conclusively" on an opinion of independent legal
counsel. 50 Both Montana and Missouri add provisions that the director-determination shall not be participated in by the more obviously interested insider who is
himself a defendant. In the event that his disqualification makes a quorum impossible, the determination is to be made, in Montana, by a committee of three
disinterested shareholders, and in Missouri, by "a committee of three persons appointed by the shareholders."'
These variations are interesting not so much for their cumbersomeness, as for
their recognition of the danger, which the unvaried Delaware-type statute ignores, of
allowing the directors a completely free hand in determining when and on what
terms they or their colleague-directors or officers should be indemnified. Other
problems of direct conflict in voting by insiders on such benefits as their own compensation, on contracts in which they have a direct or indirect interest, or on the

rejection of corporate opportunities later taken by themselves, are recognized in
corporation law. They are dealt with by such rules as the requirement of shareholder action or approval, subjection of the transaction in question to review by the

court for fairness, or invalidation of the transaction altogether. Even in the absence
of direct conflict, the dominant position occupied on many, if not most, boards by
full-time employees of the corporation 5 2 increases the probability of partiality toward
the insider in an indemnity decision made by directors.
Even though many boards are not likely to want or need to test the limits of
the "nonexclusive" clause by enacting "other and further" indemnity provisions
going beyond the specifications in the first part of the statute, unlimited possibilities
for doing so are left open by the statute; and at the very least, it is fair to assume
that under bylaws enacted in the "new look" states, the insiders are almost invariably
'0 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-14 (Supp. 1956).
e0MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-412 (2)

(I947).

In Montana, as in Kentucky, the indemnifica-

tion 1includes any amount paid in compromise. Cf. note 28 supra.
MoNTr.REv. CODEs ANN. § 15-412 (2) (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.355 (1949).
"PAuL

V. DIcKsoN, COPENSATrION

AND

DUTIES

OF

CORPORATE

DIRECTORs

(National Industrial

Conference Board Studies in Business Policy No. 16 (1946), found that in 1946, full-time paid
officers represented a majority of the boards of half the 535 corporations surveyed. One of ten reported
xoo% officer boards.
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giving themselves a "right" to indemnity as unqualified as any that they can get
53
by statute in a "right" state.
The third type of reaction to the common law is represented by California and
North Carolina, the two remaining states which have enacted indemnity provisions.
They may both be said to recognize more than the other states the variety of circumstances in each case that are relevant to preventing a mischarge either to the
corporation or the insider. The California statute"4 was the first of the two to be
enacted and is simplest in its provisions: the whole matter is handed to the court
for a completely ad hoc determination on each application, and no bylaw, article,
resolution, or contract is permitted to have any control over the court's determination. This solution to the complexities of indemnity reflects confidence that the judge
who hears the matter will accord proper weight to the various circumstances of the
case, and that he is better able to do so than anyone else in an area where he is
operating with uncontrolled discretion under a statute, uninhibited by past commonlaw mistakes. In a sense, this unique and drastically exclusive solution can be regarded as a form of turning back to, or starting over with, the common law.
The effect of the North Carolina statute16 is, like California's, to leave nothing
to the insider and everything to the court in derivative actions in which the insider
is partially or wholly successful. The language of "corporate power" is not employed.
The insider in a derivative action in which, "or in the settlement" of which, he is
partly or wholly successful is entitled to indemnification "for so much of his
expenses .. . as the judge ..

.

finds to be reasonable ...

if . . . the court finds that

his conduct fairly and equitably merits such relief." A wholly or partly successful
settlement for the defendant, while not defined, would presumably be one where less
than the full amount of the relief sought in the complaint was provided by settlement.
"The North Carolina statute is the only one that recognizes that different equities
might exist in nonderivative actions. It provides separate rules for indemnity in
those cases, leaving less to the ad hoc discretion of the judge and giving more to the
insider than does California, in the way of assurance that business-connected litigation expenses will be borne by the corporation as a matter of course. The insider
is given a right of indemnity in nonderivative actions if wholly successful on the
merits. If he were successful otherwise than solely on the merits, the statute leaves
to the board of directors the determination whether to assume his expenses, but im-

"

Of ioo representative indemnity provisions adopted by corporations in 1941, there was a "direct
grant of indemnity" in ninety-two. The grant in ninety was not exclusive. In ninety-two cases, the
primary basis for exception was a judgment of "derelict, liable, negligent, etc." See Bates and Zuckert,
supra note 20 at appendix. For example, the Willys bylaw adopted in 1946, "purportedly in conformity
with the Delaware statute," went beyond the language of the statute.

The statutory exception of in-

demnity for negligence or misconduct appears in the bylaw as an exception for "wilful misfeasance, bad
" Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, 204 F.2d 888, 891,
faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard ..
n. 5 ( 3 d Cir. 1953). See note 44 supra.
" CAL. CORP. CODE § 830. For an analysis of this statute, see Ballantine, California's 1943 Statute
as to Directors" Litigation Expenses, 31 CALiF. L. Rav. 515 (1943).
"N.C. Gat;. STAT. §§ 55-19, 55-20, 55-21 (Supp. 1955).
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poses no duty on the directors of making fact-determinations.

When he is partly

or wholly unsuccessful, he may, nevertheless, be paid if the holders of a majority
of disinterested shares so vote at a meeting duly noticed to take such action.
The North Carolina solution, which is made exclusive by the statute, is, thus,
the most detailed in recognizing the problems of avoiding a mischarge to either the
corporation or the insider and in undertaking to provide rules for resolving them 7
It deserves careful consideration both by courts and legislatures in those states where
no statute has been enacted, as well as in states, such as New York and Connecticut,
where revision of the corporation statutes is reported now to be under way.
A consideration of statutes which affect the ultimate burden of litigation expenses
would not be complete without reference to the "security-for-expenses" statutes,
enacted in the five states of New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and
California,"' under which insiders' expenses, including attorneys' fees, in derivative
actions brought by "small" shareholders may be shifted from the indemnifying
corporation to the plaintiff-shareholder 0 While the indemnification statutes look
to the allocation of expenses as a matter of fairness or appropriateness, the security
statutes, by imposing a risk on parties known to be in no position to assume it,
allocate expenses as a device to deter the initiation of derivative actions by such
parties.
As with indemnification, New York led the way. The language of the statute
and the impetus for its enactment came from a report on derivative actions by
a committee of the New York State Chamber of Commerce in 1944.P0 The premises
and conclusions of that report, which are reflected in all but the California statute,
were that many "nuisance" or "strike" actions had been brought solely or primarily
for their settlement value to the shareholder or their fee value to his attorney, that
an action initiated by the holder of shares too small in number to receive substantial
benefit from a corporate recovery was probably such'an action and was groundless
in more cases than not, and that such actions ought to be deterred. 1
The New York statute was, accordingly, enacted in 1944 to provide that in a
derivative action begun by the holder of less than five per cent in number of the
outstanding shares, unless their market value exceeded $50,000, security must be
"Old.§ 55-x9.
" A statute which would undertake "more careful particularization" of the situations in which
recovery would be allowed was recommended in a Comment, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 104, 117-I8 (1952),
before the North Carolina statute was enacted.
"The Maryland security-for-expenses provision excludes attorneys' fees. Rule 328b, Maryland Rules
of Procedure, MD. ANN. CODE 14X5 (Supp. 1957).
" For discussions of security-for-expense statutes, see Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders'
(947); Should New York's "Security for Expenses" Act Be
Derivative Suits, 47 CoLum. L. REV.
Amended? 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 37 (i951); Pierce, Security for Expenses in Stockholder's Derivative
Actions, in CUtRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 388 (1952); Note, Security for Expenses Legislation
-Summary, Analysis, and Critique, 52 CoLum. L. REV. 267 (1952).
0
S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERVATIVE SUITS (1944). For
FRANKLIN
'

a criticism of this report, see Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York,
L. REv. 123 (1944).
32 CALIF.
1

WOOD, op. cit. supra note 6o, at

21, 24-25,

33, 36, 47, 76,

1i2-I7.
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given for the reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, which might be incurred
by the corporation and the individual defendants in the action.0 2 The statute further
provides that the corporation "shall have recourse" to such security in such amount
as the court shall determine upon termination of the action. Expenses of the
insiders would always be incurred by the corporation and could thus be shifted to
such a shareholder whenever the matter ended otherwise than upon "adjudgment for
negligence or misconduct" of the individual defendants in the three states of New
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, which have both indemnification-as-a-matterof-right statutes as well as security-for-expenses statutes. Pending the final outcome,
the risk of payment would hang prohibitively over the head of any "small" shareholder, as defined in the statute, who might consider initiating such an action alone
or without being joined by others whose holdings aggregated the statutory mini63
mum.
The classification of shareholders who have to post security or pay defendants'
fees was enlarged in the three states which soon adopted the New York statute.
In 1945, New Jersey enacted a requirement that the holder have more than five per
cent of the par or stated capital value of all the shares of every class in order to escape
the security requirement0 4 Pennsylvania 6 and Wisconsin 6 removed the marketvalue exception, so that the holder of shares in excess of $5o00 would still be
required to post security if his holdings were less than the required percentage,
which, in Wisconsin, was lowered to three per cent.
Since by far the greater number of the holders of corporate shares in the United
States hold less than five per cent or even three per cent in number or value of
the outstanding shares and less than $5oo0 in aggregate market value, 7 the effect
of these statutes in the commercially important states where they have been adopted
has been to make the institution of derivative actions by most shareholders practically impossible 6 8
Whatever may have been or may still be the abuses of derivative actions brought
" N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw § 61-b.
" If the action is brought in the federal district court in New York, however, all joining plaintiffs
must have owned their shares at the time of the transaction complained of, under the holding of
Kaufman v. Wolfson, X36 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
" N.J. STAT. ANN. S 14:3-15 (Supp. 1956).
e PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (1953).
"6Wis. STAT. § 180.405 (4) (1955).

"'In x929, the aggregate holdings of the twenty largest stockholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad
amounted to 2.7%; of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, 4%. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. AND
A survey of 120
GARDiNER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 47 (x932).
manufacturing corporations having assets of more than Soo,ooo,ooo each in 1948 indicated that five
out of six holders owned ioo shares or less. Who Owns "Big Business"?, 87 TRusts & ESTATES 5
(1948).. "Random examples" of the market value of a 3% holding of any of nine Wisconsin corporations in 1956 showed the values to be from a minimum of %223,297 to a maximum of $3,466,56o.
Note, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 322, 325.

See number of stockholders and amount of invested capital and

assets of 500 largest United States industrial corporations.

Fortune, July 1957, the Fortune directory

supplement.
8 See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLuzs. L. REv. z, 5 (1947).
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without adequate grounds, alternatives to curbing these abuses by killing off the
action do exist. One is suggested by the California statute.6 9 As with indemnificadon in that state, the matter is left to the supervision and discretion of the courtThe statute provides that the court may fix security if the party moving for it establishes a probability in support of the ground that there is no reasonable probability
of benefit to the corporation from the action of the security holders.P
A similar alternative is suggested by federal securities statutes. The Securities:
Exchange Act of 1934, without assuming the probability that any action is an abuse,
empowers the court, "in its discretion," to assess, or require security for, costs,
including attorney's fees, of either party in an action for manipulation of securitie&
prices.P1 This section has been interpreted in a stockholders' derivative action to-require the defendant moving for security to assume the burden of showing that
the action is being abused. Likewise, the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, givesthe court discretion in any action under the Act to require either party to pay or
give security for his opponent's expenses, including attorney's fees, if judgment is
rendered against the party and if the court believes the unsuccessful action or defense"to have been without merit. '7' And the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 provides that
"due regard to the merits and good faith of the claims or defenses" shall govern,
security and assessment in an action for liability for making a misleading statement 4
and in security and assessment which may be required of holders of less than ten per
cent in aggregate amount of indenture securities by agreement of parties to the indenture.
Finally, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which requires court approval of
any compromise or settlement of a derivative action, with notice to all share-holders, 76 is an effective curb on the secret settlement or "pay-off" of the shareholderthat many writers have in mind when they use the term "strike" suit. 77 The prevalence of such settlements in the i92o's and early i93o's undoubtedly gave rise to thefederal rule, to the federal statutes, and to many of the abuses decried in the New"
York report. The adoption of such a rule, instead of a security-for-expenses pro-vision, would leave any shareholder free, without undue risk, to protect the corporation's interests through a derivative action whenever such protection seemed neces"' CAL. CORP. CODE § 834.
7' For an analysis of the California

statute, see Ballantine, Abuses of Stockholders Derivative Sut,-

How Far Is California's New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 399-

(1949).

71 48 STAT. 890, x5 U.S.C. § 78i (e) (1952).
75

Stella v. Kaiser, 83 F. Supp. 431 (S.D.N.Y.

(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
73 48 STAT. 9o8 (1934), 15
7453 STAT. 1176, 15 U.S.C.
7553 STAT. 1172, 15 U.S.C.
7 FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (c).
'" See, e.g., the statement of

X949).

See also Acker v. Schulte, 74 F. Supp. 683-;

U.S.C. § 77k (e) (1952).
§ 77wmv (a) (1952).
§ 77000 (e) (952).
Governor Edge, of New Jersey, as quoted by Ballantine, supra note 70,.

at 402; Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COLuM. L. REv. 574,590 (1942); Milano, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 5 N.Y.U. Im-RA. L. REv..
196, 197 (1950); Note, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 322, 323.
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sary. The groundlessness of any such action, instead of being assumed, may best be
demonstrated by a determined defense by insiders protected in their litigative efforts
by appropriate indemnification. Groundlessness may then be dealt with in each
case by the usual summary procedures for dealing with groundless actions and by
discretionary power in the court to require security or assess costs and expenses.

